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Abstract
How do incentives to engage in costly signaling depend on
social structure? This paper formalises and extends Thorstein
Veblen￿ s theory of how costly signaling by conspicuous consump-
tion depends on social structure. A noisy signaling game is in-
troduced in which spectators observe signals only imperfectly,
and use Bayesian updating to interpret the observed signals. It
is shown that this noisy signaling game has (under some weak
regularity conditions) a unique plausible Perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Then, a social information network is introduced
as a second source of information about a player￿ s type. Equi-
librium signaling depends in the resulting game on the relative
quality of the substitute sources of information, which depends
again on the social network. For some highly stylised networks,
the dependence of equilibrium costly signaling on network charac-
teristics (network size, density and connectedness, the centrality
of the consumer in the network) is studied, and a simple domi-
nance result for more arbitrary networks is suggested.
1 Introduction
Distinction is one of the stronger motives of human and animal conduct.
Through costly, conspicuously and often extravagantly wasting means,
humans and animals try to reveal their abundance of purchasing power,
talent or ￿tness to spectators in a convincing way. This conspicuous
waste may be understood by direct motivations, as people generally en-
joy a feeling of superiority (Frank, 1985b,1999), or instrumental reasons,
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1as distinguishing oneself from competitors is crucial in any economic
situation of cooperation with endogenous partner choice in which the
joint surplus depends on the imperfectly visible qualities of the part-
ners. Competition for the best or most partners, by revealing yourself
as the most attractive party, drives sexual selection among all sexually
reproducing species (Darwin, 1871, Miller, 2000), job market signaling
(Spence, 1973), marriages (Cole, Mailath, Postlewaite, 1995), advertis-
ing in trade, facade building in banking and insurance, friendships...
Most consumption goods in post-industrial societies, are valued both for
their intrinsic (physical) characteristics and for what they communicate
about the quality of their consumer to spectators.
This paper concerns the impact of the structure of the social network
in which the consumers live and exchange information on the equilib-
rium level of costly signaling. The transmission mechanism from social
network structure to the signaling equilibrium, is inspired by the ￿ The
Theory of the Leisure Class￿(1899) of Thorstein Veblen. According to
Veblen, not only income and the distribution of incomes determined
the incentives to invest in wasteful, highly visible forms of consumption.
The structure of a society had to be understood as a major factor as well
in explaining di⁄erences in costly ostentatious display. Veblen (1899)
notes that "Conspicuous consumption claims a relatively larger portion
of the income of the urban than of the rural population, and the claim is
also more imperative. The result is that, in order to keep up a decent
appearance, the former habitually live hand to mouth to a larger extent
than the latter. So it comes, for instance, that the American farmer
and his wife and daughters are notoriously less modish in their dress, as
well as less urbane in their manners, than the city artisan￿ s family with
equal income. [...] And in the struggle to outdo one another the city
population push their normal standard of conspicuous consumption to a
higher point [...]. The requirement of conformity to this higher conven-
tional standard becomes mandatory. The standard of decency is higher,
class for class, and this requirement of decent appearance must be lived
up to on pain of losing caste." The reason for this disparity in incentives
for ostentatious consumption between rural and urban areas lies, accord-
ing to Veblen, in some fundamental characteristics of social structure.1
When the size of social groups increases, and when human mobility is
enhanced, ostentatious display of wealth becomes the predominant way
of establishing a good reputation. "So long as the community or social
group is small enough and compact enough to be e⁄ectually reached by
1Veblen￿ s argument is in fact about the impact of social structure on the incentives
for conspicuous consumption compared to leisure, but they may be extended easily
for the case of optimal signalling in general.
2common notoriety alone [...], so long [leisure] is about as e⁄ective as
[conspicuous consumption]." But with the development of trade, and
the improvement of means of transportation and communication, the
importance of ostentatious display is boosted. "The means of commu-
nication and the mobility of the population now expose the individual to
the observation of many persons who have no other means of judging of
his reputability than the display of goods [...]. The modern organization
of industry works in the same direction also by another line. The exi-
gencies of the modern industrial system frequently place individuals and
households in juxtaposition between whom there is little contact in any
other sense than that of juxtaposition. One￿ s neighbors, mechanically
speaking, often are socially not one￿ s neighbors, or even acquaintances;
and still their transient good opinion has a high degree of utility. [...]
In the modern community, there is also a more frequent attendance of
large gatherings of people to whom one￿ s everyday life is unknown; in
such places as churches, theatres, ballroom, hotels, parks, shops and the
like."
This paper develops Veblen￿ s argument further, using a social infor-
mation network as an additional source of information which serves as
a substitute to costly signaling, and traces the impact of the network
structure on optimal signaling and status induced consumption. In the
second section, I develop a noisy signaling game by which consumers de-
cide on their level of costly signaling when signals are only imperfectly
observed and interpreted by Bayesian players. I introduce an equilib-
rium re￿nement which allows the selection of a unique Perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibrium and then investigate the equilibrium properties and
comparative statics. In the third section of the paper, a social network
is inserted into this noisy signaling model as a second source of infor-
mation. The impact of network characteristics (network size, density,
connectedness) and position (centrality) in the network) on equilibrium
signaling is studied for a class of highly stylized networks and a simple
dominance result is suggested for more arbitrary networks. The fourth
section concludes.
The impact of social structure on costly signaling has drawn little at-
tention from researchers. The most related papers to this one are those
of Corneo and Jeanne (1998,1999), who investigate social segmentation
(the probability of meeting someone of the same type) on signaling and
the ￿ counter signaling￿paper of Feltovich, Harbaugh, and To (2002). Fel-
tovich et alii analyze the possibility of an equilibrium in which, in the
presence of a second, noisy signal of quality, the highest of three types
pools with the lowest type to distinguish herself from the middle type.
Frank (1985a) shortly considers the possibility of a second noisy source
3of information, and the use of an minimal variance unbiased estimator
to pool these two sources of information about a consumer￿ s type. More
generally, this paper combines insights from the literatures on costly
signaling (surveyed by Riley, 2001), relative concerns (Truyts, 2005), in-
formation pooling (Clemen, 1999) and, ￿nally, social networks in general
(Jackson, 2006) and small world networks in particular (Watts, 2004).
2 Bayesian Noisy Signaling
2.1 Setting
Imagine a population of N consumers, denoted by the set N ￿ fi = 1;:::; Ng.
These consumers are heterogeneous in income, m:2 I restrict the type-
space of a consumer i, denoted Mi; to two types, a low and high income
type, indexed by t 2 T ￿ fL;Hg; such that the income of consumer i;
denoted m(i); is in Mi ￿ fmL;mHg with 0 < mL < mH < +1. Hence,
the typespace is M ￿ (Mi)
N = fmL;mHg
N : Each consumer in N is
of type H with a prior probability p 2]0;1[ and of type L with prior
probability 1 ￿ p.
Each consumer i may spend her income m(i) on two perfectly di-
visible commodities, I 2 R+ and c 2 R+. Commodity I (for ￿ status
investment￿ ) only serves signaling and generates no other (￿ intrinsic￿ )
utility. Hence, in social isolation or in the absence of signaling motives,
typically no I is consumed and all income may be spent on commodity
c; ￿ rest consumption￿ , representing all other commodities which are con-
sumed for intrinsic reasons.3 Denoting consumer i￿ s consumption of the
two commodities by ci and Ii and assuming that units of consumption
are such that prices may be normalized to 1.
The payo⁄s of each consumption bundle (ci;Ii) are represented by
a preference ranking over commodity bundles which is identical over all
consumers and may by assumption be represented by a utility function.
To avoid risk complications intermingling with the signaling analysis, I
assume that the utility function is risk neutral in the second argument,
and take the utility function to be quasi-linear
U(ci; ^ mi(Ii)) = V (ci) + ￿^ mi(Ii): (1)
2This may rather easily be generalized to productivity or ￿tness, to extend the
model to labour market or handicap signaling types of sexual selection models.
3This assumption of no intrinsic utility from I may of course easily be relaxed.
In this case consumers typically consume some positive amount Io in social isolation,
equating marginal intrinsic utility from c and I: Signaling motives then provide an
extra marginal utility term, driving equilibrium I away from Io. I omit this intrinsic
utility term for clarity and simplicity, and hence consider the bias away from zero
signaling caused by signaling incentives.
4The term ^ mi(Ii) denotes the expected value of the spectators￿estimate of
consumer i￿ s income, which will be seen to depend on her level of costly
signaling Ii and to be based on Bayesian updating.4 The parameter
0 < ￿ < 1 represents the constant marginal utility of an extra unit




@ci > 0 and
@2V (:)
@2ci < 0: Since utility is everywhere strictly increasing in
both arguments, utility maximisation implies that the budget constraint
is always satis￿ed with equality: ci + Ii = m(i):
A distinguishing feature of the present consumer problem is that
spectators, which are all other consumers in this game, observe the status
investment Ii of each other consumer i only imperfectly. More specif-
ically, they observe consumer i￿ s status investment distorted by some
random error term "i: such that the observed status investment is5
yi = Ii + "i: (2)
The error distribution is assumed to be independent of the identity of the
signaler and of her signaling level and of the draws of all other consumers,
and distributed along some probability density function ’(";￿ = 0;￿2);
in which ￿ is the mean and ￿2 the variance. The strict monotone
likelihood ratio property with respect to the mean for some den-
sity distribution ’(";￿;￿2) may be de￿ned as the requirement that, for
￿ > ￿0; the ratio
’(";￿;￿2)
’(";￿0;￿2) is monotonically and strictly increasing over
the whole support of ’(:): I need the following restrictions on density
function ’(:):
Condition 1 Let ’(";￿;￿2) be a continuous and C2 probability density
function which is i) symmetric and unimodal, ii) has the real line for
support and iii) satis￿es the strict monotone likelihood ratio property
with respect to the mean.
4This speci￿cation may be interpreted as shorthand notation for the following
scheme: a spectator observes and interprets the noisy signal yi; and chooses a utility
maximising action as best reply to the noisy signal yi; according to her beliefs about
the type of the sender: It is assumed that the optimal responses of the receiver
are described by a unique best reply function; which is strictly and monotonically
increasing in ^ m (see e.g. employers setting wages in Bertrand competition in Spence￿ s
job market game). The utility of the sender is assumed to increase strictly and
monotonically in the reply of the receiver. The utility function in formula 1 takes
the beliefs of the receiver, represented by the expected value ^ m(:); directly as an
argument, and is as such shorthand notation, omitting the receiver￿ s best reply.
5This error term could just as well be made dependent on spectator identity: nei-
ther the distributions nor the results shown hereafter would change. For notational
simplicity, the error is here taken to be the same for all spectators.
5By part ii of condition 1, out-of-equilibrium observed signals are not
an issue, as all yi 2 R will have an equilibrium interpretation. Part
iii of condition 1 ensures that posterior probabilities will be strictly
monotonic. Since yi = Ii + "i; one may write the distribution of yi (for
i of type t) as ’(yi;It;￿2): A prominent example of a density function
satisfying condition 1 is the normal density function. When used under
an inde￿nite integral over yi; density function ’(:) will be abbreviated as
’t ￿ ’(yi;It;￿2): The ￿rst order derivative of this density function to-




Finally, it is assumed that all players have perfect knowledge of the game
and all its parameters, and know that they all know this etcetera.
How should a consumer now choose an optimal strategy, and how
should spectators interpret an observed level of signaling yi? Let game
￿ denote the baseline noisy signaling game. The choice of a consumer i
can, by equation 2, be summarised by a mapping Ii : Mi ! Ii : m(i) !
I (m(i)); called her signaling strategy, with Ii ￿ [0;m(i)] consumer i￿ s
￿ strategy space￿ . Hence, the strategy space of each consumer i is an
interval of the real line containing in￿nitely many strategies. Since in this
section consumers only di⁄er in income m which comes only in 2 types,
the signaling strategy will be the same for all consumers of the same type
t. It will therefore be convenient in this section to write the strategy and
strategy spaces only for both types as It : Mt ! It ￿ [0;mt] : mt ! It.
A strategy pro￿le is an N-tuple hI1;I2;:::;INi, which is an element of the
N-dimensional strategy space (Ii)
N. The (N ￿ 1)-tuple I￿i 2 (Ii)
N￿1
is to denote the strategy pro￿le of the N ￿ 1 other players which some
consumer i faces, and likewise the ordered pair I ￿ hIL;IHi 2 IL ￿ IH
summarizes a strategy pro￿le in terms of types, and I￿t denotes the
strategy of the type other than t.
Now, assume that spectators know (e.g. by deduction, as will be
demonstrated) the actual status investments of both types of players.
Then these spectators may after observing a distorted signal yi from
consumer i; update the probability of i being of the high type by Bayes￿
rule. If P(t;yi) denotes the posterior probability that i is of type t given
observed signal yi, one may write
P(H;yi;I) =
p’(yi;IH;￿2)
(1 ￿ p)’(yi;IL;￿2) + p’(yi;IH;￿2)
; (3)
while obviously P(L;yi;I) = 1 ￿ P(H;yi;I): Spectators will therefore
estimate the income of consumer i to be mHP(H;yi;I) + mLP(L;yi;I)
= mL + (mH ￿ mL)P(H;yi;I): Multiplying this expression with the
probability density ’(yi;It;￿2) that the signal of a consumer of type t
is observed as yi; one may compute the expected value of the impression
6Figure 1: ’(yi j IL;￿2); ’(yi j IH;￿2); P(H j yi;I) and the surface
￿ m(IH j IL) in gray:
on the spectators which a consumer of type t makes with investments It
given I￿t as
^ mt(It) = mL + (mH ￿ mL)
Z
P(H;yi;I)’tdyi: (4)
Note that by the term P(H;yi;I), the interpretation of each observed
signal yi depends on the the status investments of both types. As such,
this interpretation or ￿ meaning￿of each observed signal yi introduces
an interpersonal interdependency into game ￿, making this consumer
problem a problem of strategic interaction between the di⁄erent types.




The term ￿ mt(It;I￿t) represents the expected probability of a type t
consumer, given her own investments It and the other type￿ s invest-
ments I￿t; being taken for a high type, i.e. the expected value of
the posterior of being a high type, and will be a central concept in
the remainder of this paper. Figure 1 illustrates the density func-
tions ’(yi;IH;￿2) and ’(yi;IL;￿2); the posterior of being a high type
P(H;yi;I), and the integral ￿ mH(IH;IL); which is represented by the gray
area. Since ￿ mH(IH;IL) is the area under the product of P(H;yi;I) and
’(yi;IH;￿2); it can be seen to be the surface under the density function
’(yi;IH;￿2) minus a margin at the left side. Similarly, ￿ mL(IL;IH); the
surface under the product P(H;yi;I) and ’(yi;IL;￿2); is a small bell
shaped surface under the right tail of ’(yi;IL;￿2):
One may simplify the problem further by exploiting the structure of
￿ mt in two ways. Firstly, one may easily see that game ￿ is constant
7sum in the expected social impression term ^ m by writing down the total
amount of ￿ mt to be divided among the N consumers (abusing notation
in the ￿rst term) as
N X
i=1













Hence, Bayesian consistency logically implies that (1 ￿ p)￿ mL(IL;IH) +
p￿ mH(IH;IL) = p, which means that








(1 ￿ ￿ mH(IH;IL)): (6)
Secondly, one may exploit the standard and well known insensitivity
of continuous density functions for certain a¢ ne transformations, such





’(yi;It;￿2); for ￿ 2 R+: Since ￿ m is computed as a inde￿nite integral,
the addition of A or multiplication with ￿ are yi of course neutral within
the integral. Setting A = ￿IL and ￿ = 1
￿, one may ￿nally rewrite the






which further only depends on the prior p and density function ’(:):
One may therefore ￿nally write down the rescaled expected spectators￿
estimates of the high types as


























(1 ￿ ￿ m(￿)):
The two last simpli￿cations suggest some properties of game ￿ which
are interesting in their own right, and play an important role in the
welfare analysis of the equilibria in the remainder of the paper. They
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the noisy signaling game ￿ it is true for any strategy
pro￿le hIL;IHi that:
1. ￿ is constant sum in ^ m, as ￿ mH(IH;IL) = 1 ￿
(1￿p)
p ￿ mL(IL;IH):
2. The integral ^ m depends only on ￿ ￿
IH￿IL
￿ ; and not on the actual
level of I: Subtracting IL (assuming that IL < IH) from the con-
sumption bundle of all i 2 N does not a⁄ect utility. The amount
IL:N is purely wasted.





is maximized if all players play their ￿ intrinsic￿optimum:8i 2 N :
hci;Iii = hm(i);0i.
Part i) of proposition 3 (and equations 5 and 6) mean that gains
in expected impression of one type are necessarily compensated exactly
by the losses in expected impression for the other type, when appropri-
ately accounting for di⁄erences in relative numbers. If the high types
manage to increase their expected impression ￿ mH(:) by separating them-
selves from the low types (increasing ￿), and hence by being confused
less with low types, then the expected impression of the low types neces-
sarily decreases by just that much (compensated for relative numbers),
because they are confused less with high types. Since, by condition 1
ii, " has the real line for support, the high income types can never fully
separate themselves from the low types. High income types can how-
ever, by buying some of the signaling good I, purchase some degree of
separation from the lower types and push up their expected impression
on spectators. Low types, in their turn, can buy some quantity of the
9signaling commodity I to undo some of the separation achieved by the
high types. In doing so, they increase the confusion and thereby their
expected impression on spectators. The low types maximally achievable
expected impression is achieved when IL = IH; the pooling outcome,
when it is true that ￿ mL = ￿ mH = p: High income types try to move
away from this outcome, low income types try to move closer to it. The
essence of noisy signaling game ￿ can be seen as an arms race between
two types, both wasting considerable amount of means to pull as much
as possible of the ￿xed quantity ^ m to their side. Hence, in terms of
￿gure 1, for a given ￿; the distribution of expected impression ￿ m is de-
termined by the distance IH ￿ IL only. The distance from the origin
to IL is purely wasted: if both IH and IL were shifted to the left by a
distance IL; ￿ mL and ￿ mH and utility would remain unchanged. So the
quantity IL which all consumers invested in status investments, is pure
waste, whereas the amount IH ￿ IL which high income consumers pur-
chase in excess of IL merely shifts expected impression from low types to
high types. Hence, utilitarian welfare is maximised when all consumers
spend their total income on rest consumption.
What happens to ￿ m(￿) by marginally increasing ￿? By applying















The ￿rst integral represents the ￿ interpretation e⁄ect￿ : the changes in the
interpretation of each observed signal yi as a consequence of a marginal
increase in ￿; keeping the expected occurence of each yi constant. The
second integral contains what one might call the ￿ occurrence e⁄ect￿ : the
e⁄ect of shifting the probability distribution of observing some signal yi
marginally to the right, keeping the interpretation of each yi ￿xed. The
￿rst integral will typically be negative, whereas the second term is always
positive, as it implies a rightward shift of probability mass over a strictly









￿dyi which is strictly positive for
all distributions ’(:) that satisfy condition 1. This is summarized in the
following lemma for ￿ ￿ 0; which will be motivated soon.
Lemma 3 For all continuous probability densities ’(";￿;￿2) satisfying
the requirements in condition 1, it is true that
@ ￿ m(￿)
@￿ > 0 for all ￿ 2 R+:
Proof. In appendix.
10Figure 2: ￿ m(￿) for ￿ 2 [0;5], p 2]0;1[; and ’(:) the normal density
function
The shape of the integral ￿ m(￿) as a function of ￿ 2 [0;5] and p 2
]0;1[; and with ’(:) the normal density function, is depicted in ￿gure 2.
Note that the pooling value is of course linear in p : i.e. ￿ m(0) = p: As p
gets lower, the pooling outcome deteriorates, and thereby the stakes for
both types to establish of undo separation: ￿ m(￿) becomes steeper as p
gets lower. Note ￿nally that for bell shaped density functions such as
the normal density function, ￿ m(￿) takes a sigmoid form, and is hence
partly convex and partly concave, which slightly complicates equilibrium
analysis in the next section.
2.2 Equilibrium analysis
The problems of the high and low income consumers may now be stated
more conveniently, using equations 2, 4, 6 and 7 as
MaxIH V (mH ￿ IH) + ￿
￿





















s:t: IL;IH ￿ 0:
The equilibrium concept used in the analysis of noisy signaling game
￿ is the Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, which
requires that information is processed according to Bayes￿rule and that
the equilibrium strategy pro￿le is a ￿xed point of the best reply mapping,
just like the common Nash equilibrium.
De￿nition 4 (Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium) The Perfect Bayesian
11Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of the noisy signaling game ￿ is a strategy pro-
￿le (I￿
L;I￿
H) and a speci￿cation of posterior beliefs P(t;yi) such that:
1. For all types t, I￿
t is the expected utility maximizing strategy given





t 2 argmaxV (mt ￿ It) + ￿[(mH ￿ mL) ￿ mt(￿) + mL]
2. All consumers, as spectators, use Bayes rule to update information
P(mt;yi), as shown in formula 3.
A Pure Strategy Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE) is a
Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies.
In general, the noisy signaling game will have multiple PBNE, of
which many are uninteresting, e.g. the case in which no investments are
made by neither of the types and in which signals are not interpreted
(such that P(H;yi;I) = p for all yi and I) by spectators is a PBNE. The
common equilibrium re￿nements in signaling games (Intuitive Criterion,
Divinity, Universal Divinity, Credible Deviations...) solve little since
they rely on out-of-equilibrium signals, which do not perceivably exist
in noisy signaling game ￿ under condition 1. More general Nash equi-
librium selection tools, such as perfection, seem to miss cutting power as
well in the present case. I propose to select the PNBE which is robust to
learning by spectators, in the sense that equilibrium signaling strategies
are the best reply to the equilibrium strategy of the other type if the
noisy signals are correctly interpreted by spectators, and call this PBNE
an True PBNE.
De￿nition 5 (True PNBE) Let a True Perfect Bayesian Nash Equi-
librium (T-PBNE) of noisy signaling game ￿ be a PBNE in which no
type would have an incentive to deviate if her deviation were correctly
observed by spectators.
Hence, a True Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is a ￿xed point
of the best reply correspondences in signaling strategies if that all noisy
signals are correctly interpreted. One may think of at least two justi￿ca-
tions for the selection of this PBNE. Firstly, spectators may be expected
to learn to interpret signals correctly, such that if a consumer type devi-
ates from her original signaling strategy, this strategy will be recognised
by the spectators on a su¢ ciently short term. Each consumer type may
therefore be expected to choose a best reply signaling strategy against
12the strategy of the other type, assuming that spectators interpret each
distorted signal correctly. Secondly, spectators facing a noisy signal yi;
which they cannot trace this signal back to the original undistorted sig-
nal, might replay the noisy signaling game ￿ in their imagination. They
may then infer that some types would want to deviate in a PBNE which
is not a T-PBNE, if they would only be recognised as such. Specta-
tors may ￿nd it therefore plausible to imagine the best replies of each of
the types, to predict an T-PBNE in their head and use its equilibrium
strategies to interpret observed noisy signals. These two interpretations
greatly bene￿t from the uniqueness and global asymptotic stability of
the T-PBNE in game ￿; which will be shown below.
Given the correct interpretation of noisy signals, the Kuhn-Tucker



























@￿(￿) = 0: In the case of an interior optimum I￿
H,
the above ￿rst order condition may be written as an equality of marginal





















, such that the ￿rst order condition for
an interior solution (IL > 0) to the problem of the low income consumers









Hence, marginally increasing It implies for type t consumers a de-
crease in rest consumption by one unit (by equation 2) and that the
expected impression ￿ m(￿) is a⁄ected by an increase of 1
￿ in ￿ for the
high types, and a decrease of 1
￿ in ￿ for low types. The ￿rst order
conditions in 10 and 11 may be interpreted as a tangency condition be-







￿ for the high types, in which the LHS
depicts the marginal rate of substitution between rest consumption (the
opportunity cost of It) and ￿ mt; and the RHS the increases in ￿ mt by
marginally increasing It (and equivalent for the low types). By equality
13Figure 3: Tangency of indi⁄erence curves to ￿ m(￿):
5, i.e. because ￿ m(￿) = ￿ mH(IH;IL) = 1 ￿
(1￿p)
p ￿ mL(IL;IH), the indif-
ference curve of the high types is tangential to ￿ m(￿) from above, and
(1￿p)
p times the indi⁄erence curve of the low income types is tangential
to ￿ m(￿) from below. In ￿gure 3, the tangency between the sigmoid
￿ m(￿) and the indi⁄erence curves, of the high types (ICH(IH; ￿ m)) and
the low types (ICL(IL; ￿ m) times
(1￿p)
p ) are depicted. Note that these
indi⁄erence curves should be read di⁄erently: points above the indi⁄er-
ence curve are better points for the high types, and worse for the low
types (higher ￿ m(￿)), and a rightward move for the low types should be
read as a decrease in IL.
This tangency condition nicely illustrates the second order condition
one needs to impose to guarantee equilibrium existence. The indi⁄erence
curves (better than sets) are convex by assumption, but since the ￿ m-
surface may be both convex and concave, the indi⁄erence curves may
be tangential to ￿ m(￿) over an interval of the player￿ s strategy space
or -worse- on two disconnected subsets of her strategy set. In order
to ensure that the best reply set is convex, it is su¢ cient to require
that the curvature of the indi⁄erence curve is always stronger than the
curvature of the ￿ m-surface. If one requires this condition to be satis￿ed
strictly, then the set of best replies is always a singleton, and the best-
reply correspondence is in fact a function. This is obviously equivalent
to imposing strict concavity on the consumer problem.
Condition 6 (Second order conditions) Let V (:);￿; ￿2;(mH ￿ mL);
p and ’(:) be such that is holds for 8I 2 I that

















This second order condition may be interpreted as a restriction on
the curvature of V (:) given the parameters ￿; ￿2;(mH ￿ mL) and p and
the functional form of ’(:) or rather as a restriction on the parameters,
e.g. on the relative importance of expected impression ￿; given V (:);
￿2;(mH ￿ mL) , p and ’(:).
When condition 6 is satis￿ed, the ￿rst order conditions in equations
10 and 11.de￿ne two best reply functions. These are continuous and
di⁄erentiable by the implicit function theorem if condition 6 is satis￿ed
(and as both V (:) and ’(:) are C2 by assumption): di⁄erentiating the


















which may be seen to be continuous over the whole strategy set [0;mH]
as long as condition 6 is satis￿ed (such that the denominator remains
strictly negative). One may recover the best reply function IBR
H (IL) by
computing the optimal IH for IL = 0 from 10 and using it as an initial
condition, and setting IBR
H (IL) = 0 whenever the obtained solution is
negative. Proceeding equivalently, one may also obtain a continuous
and di⁄erentiable best reply function for the low types IBR
L : [0;mH] !
[0;mL]:The existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is now
easily seen. The Cartesian product [0;mL] ￿ [0;mH] of the strategy
spaces of the two types is a rectangle with [0;mL] as a basis and [0;mH]
as a left side. IBR
L is a continuous and surjective best-reply mapping
(hence a continuous curve from top to bottom) which indicates the best
reply of the low income types to each possible strategy of the high income
consumers in [0;mH]: Equivalently, IBR
H is a function indicating the best
reply of the high types to each possible strategy of the low types, thus
continuously connecting the two sides of the rectangle. It is obvious
that these two best reply curves must cross at least once, establishing
the existence of a T-PBNE. A more formal statement of the existence
and quali￿cation of a T-PBNE in game ￿ is presented in the following
proposition.
Proposition 7 Let fI￿;P(H;I￿)g, with I￿ = hI￿
L;I￿
Hi denote the True
Pure Strategy Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (T-PBNE) of the noisy
signaling game ￿:
151. Then fI￿;P(H;I￿)g exists if the conditions 1 and 6 hold.
2. Then I￿
L ￿ I￿
H or ￿￿ ￿ I￿
H ￿ I￿
L ￿ 0 and I￿
H ￿ I￿
L = 0 =) I￿
H =
I￿
L = 0 and/or p > 1=2
3. Then fI￿;P(H;I￿)g is the unique T-PBNE of ￿ if the conditions
1 and 6 hold.
4. And then fI￿;P(H;I￿)g is globally asymptotically stable if the con-
ditions 1 and 6 hold.
Proof. In appendix.
The properties 3 and 4 of theorem 1 are in general very nice, since
they imply that the ￿xed point I￿ is the unique global attractor of the
best reply function. This suggests that the T-PBNE will be reached in
a t￿tonnement process, as long as the signals are correctly interpreted
trough e.g. a learning process. Secondly, it is important to note that
contrary to the undistorted signaling model of Spence (1973), the low
income types as well as the high income types have strictly positive
marginal bene￿ts from status signaling. This means that, if the optimum
of the low types is not a corner solution, then the consumption choice of
all types is distorted by signaling motives: Since low types may always be
mistaken for a high type, and more so if they invest in costly signaling,
there is distortion at the bottom.
What can one say about the in￿ uence of the exogenous parameters
on the equilibrium status investments I￿ (under conditions 1 and 6)?
Since one may in general not obtain an explicit solution for both the
best reply functions IBR
L (IH) and IBR
H (IL) and I￿, one has to rely on
the implicit function theorem to learn something about the direction
of changes in equilibrium investments as a result of shifting exogenous
parameters. The easiest case is the parameter ￿; measuring the marginal
utility of ^ m. The e⁄ect of increasing ￿ is rather straightforward: it
uniformly increases the marginal utility of status investments, but leaves
the opportunity costs of status investments unchanged. Alternatively,
the indi⁄erence curves of the two types become ￿ atter. As a result, the
best reply functions of both types is shifted upwardly and hence I￿ is
increasing in ￿; and I￿
t increases strictly if it is in the interior of It.
The comparative statics of ￿, mL and mH, are mostly less straight-
forward, as most of these parameters a⁄ect the equilibrium investments
I￿ non-monotonically. A ￿rst parameter of interest may be the stan-
dard deviation ￿. Firstly, when observations get more distorted, it takes
more e⁄orts to establish or undo some level of separation, while the
16opportunity costs remain constant. Secondly, however, when ￿ is mar-
ginally increased, this entails a change in ￿, and hence also a change in
the marginal e⁄ects of ￿ on ￿ m: The sign of this e⁄ect depends on the
second order derivative
@2 ￿ m(￿)
@2￿ ; and has its opposite sign. If
@2 ￿ m(￿)
@2￿ is
negative, then reducing ￿ raises the marginal e⁄ect of ￿; pushing up I￿





@2￿ ￿, where @ ￿ m
@￿(:) is always positive and
@2 ￿ m(￿)
@2￿ is partly
positive and partly negative, such that @I￿
@￿ is mostly negative.
As far as the income endowments mH and mL are concerned, one
may distinguish two separate e⁄ects: an ￿ income e⁄ect￿and a ￿ type gap
e⁄ect￿ . The ￿rst is common in most economic modelling: if income rises
(and since V (c) is concave), the opportunity cost of some level It de-
creases. Therefore the income e⁄ect will push up I￿. The second e⁄ect
is also straightforward: changes in income endowments change the in-
come gap (mH ￿ mL) between the two types, and hence what is at stake,
due to the speci￿cation of ^ m as an estimator of income levels. Changes
in this gap are comparable to changes in ￿, and as such, these ￿ stakes￿
are of course increasing in mH and decreasing in mL: Finally, there are
of course again indirect e⁄ects through changes in the marginal bene￿ts
of status signaling, due to the behavioural reactions of own and other
type, of which the sign depends on the second order derivative @2 ￿ m
@2￿(:):
Bringing all this together, it is shown that
@I￿
H
@mH > 0; as both direct ef-
fects are clearly positive. For
@I￿
L
@mH; only the ￿ type gap￿and the indirect
e⁄ect play, and as such
@I￿
L










@mH is positive most of the time: For the low in-
come endowment mL, the ￿ type gap e⁄ect￿makes that there is less at
stake for the high income individual, but that the low income types











and is mostly negative: The least clearcut are the own income e⁄ects
of the low income types. Here, the income e⁄ect is opposed to the
￿ type gap e⁄ect￿ , while the changes in marginal e⁄ect of ￿ can go either
way. As such, the sign of
@I￿
L






















These results are summarised in the following theorem.
Proposition 8 (Comparative Statics) The equilibrium signaling lev-
els I￿ in the T-PBNE of noisy signaling game ￿ depends in such a way
on the exogenous parameters ￿; ￿; mH and mL that, if conditions 1 and
6 hold:
171. I￿ is increasing in the marginal utility of social status ￿:






















3. I￿ varies with mH such that
@I￿
H























































3 Optimal status investments in a social informa-
tion network
Fortunately, wasteful costly signaling is not the only way to learn about
other consumers. People can share information by talking. Usually, they
talk to people they are related to in some way (neighbors, friends and
family, colleagues), along the lines of what might be stylized as a social
network. This paper introduces social networks as an additional source
of information about the type of other consumers as an information sup-
plement to signaling. By social acquaintance, people learn about the
true quality of other consumers, and then tend to share this knowledge
with related consumers in their social network (one might also call this
gossip). But as information spreads further on the network, information
quality deteriorates. Whereas the quality of information from conspicu-
ous consumption remains of a constant quality, the quality of the gossip
information one receives depends on the structure of the social network.
And as the quality of gossip as a supplementary source of information
depends on the social structure, so does the equilibrium investment in
signaling.
3.1 Optimal signaling in networks: the case of in-
formation substitutes
Let ￿G denote a noisy signaling game with information substitutes,
played on a social network denoted by G. Game ￿G is identical to
game ￿; except that a second source of information needs to be in-
tegrated. Let ~ yi;j 2 R denote an unbiased estimator of consumer i￿ s
18income m(i); as obtained by some other consumer j from her social re-
lations: ~ yi;j = m(i) + ~ "i;j, where ~ "i;j is an error term distributed along
some density function ~ ’
￿
~ "i;j;0; ~ ￿2
i;G
￿
; where E(~ "i;j) = 0 and the variance
depends on the structure of the social network and is denoted by ~ ￿2
i;G
for now. Hence, spectators in game ￿G observe two di⁄erent signals: the
status signaling yi = Ii +"i with "i ￿ ’("i;0;￿) and the gossip informa-
tion ~ yi;j = m(i) + ~ "i;j with ~ "i;j ￿ ~ ’("i;j;0; ~ ￿2
i;G) and all know the prior
probabilities p of being type H and (1 ￿ p) for type L: Based on each
of these separate signals, spectators might derive from these signals two
separate posterior probabilities of i being a high type, i.e. P(H;yi) as
before and
~ P(H; ~ yi;j) =
p~ ’(~ yi;j;mH; ~ ￿2
i;G)
p~ ’(~ yi;j;mH; ~ ￿2
i;G) + (1 ￿ p)p~ ’(~ yi;j;mL; ~ ￿2
i;G)






~ ’(~ yi;j;mH; ~ ￿2
i;G)
￿2
p~ ’(~ yi;j;mH; ~ ￿2





~ ￿ij;G ) as the expected impression for the high
income types for the gossip information part. This quantity is only
a function of exogenous parameters p;mH;mL; ~ ￿2
i;G and density func-
tion ~ ’: Quite equivalent to earlier derivations for ￿ m, one may write









How can spectators j 2 N handle these two di⁄erent sources of in-
formation and generically di⁄erent estimates of consumer i￿ s income?
Should one choose the best of the two unbiased estimators? A more
e¢ cient way is to combine them into one estimator, thus using all avail-
able information. I assume that spectators use linear opinion pooling
with minimal variance weight to aggregate information. Let ￿ P(H;yi; ~ yi;j)
denote the composed posterior probability that consumer i is a high in-
come type after the observation of distorted signals yi and ~ yi;j: The
￿ linear opinion pooling rule￿is then
￿ P(H;yi; ~ yi;j) = ￿P(H;yi) + (1 ￿ ￿) ~ P(H; ~ yi;j) (12)
with ￿ 2 [0;1]: As a convex combination of unbiased estimators with
￿ 2 [0;1], ￿ P(H;yi; ~ yi;j) is unbiased itself, and ￿ may then be chosen to
minimize the variance of ￿ P(:):6 Minimizing the variance of formula 12
6Alternative uses of ￿ are reviewed by Genest and McConway (1990), but these
alternative motivations do not apply to the simple context of game ￿G
19brings one to the commonly known inverse variance weights:7
￿
￿ =
V ar( ~ P(H; ~ yi;j)
V ar(P(H;yi) + V ar( ~ P(H; ~ yi;j)
: (13)
By applying ￿
￿ in formula 12, each posterior estimate of i￿ s type is
given relatively more weight if this estimate is relatively more precise
compared to the other posterior estimation. The variance of the result-
ing composed estimator can be shown to be weakly smaller than the
variances of the constituent parts (Bates & Granger, 1969). The use of
the composed posterior estimate in equations 12 and 13 is motivated by
the literature on the problem of ￿ opinion pooling￿ , ￿ information pooling￿
or ￿ forecast combination￿which has attracted quite some attention in
the management and forecasting literature.8
If all spectators use linear opinion pooling, then the normalized ex-
pected composed impression of a high income consumer, denoted
.... m(￿);
may be written:
7Min￿ V ar( ￿ P(H j yi; ~ yi)) = V ar(￿P(H j yi) + (1 ￿ ￿) ~ P(H j ~ yi)) = ￿2V ar(P(H j
yi) +(1 ￿ ￿)2V ar( ~ P(H j ~ yi)). This generates the ￿rst order condition
2￿(V ar(P(H j yi) +V ar( ~ P(H j ~ yi)) ￿2V ar( ~ P(H j ~ yi) = 0, which may be
rewritten to ￿
￿:
8An important alternative to the linear pooling rule consists of a fully Bayesian
approach, which requires the formulation and computation of the full joint conditional
and posterior distributions. For our model ￿G this can be written
￿ P(H j yi; ~ yi;j) =
p~ ’(~ yi;j j mH; ~ ￿
2
i;G)’(yi j IH;￿)
p~ ’(~ yi;j j mH; ~ ￿
2
i;G)’(yi j IH;￿) + (1 ￿ p)~ ’(~ yi;j j mH; ~ ￿
2
i;G)’(yi j IL;￿)
such that the expected impression given the two information sources, denoted .... m; of
the high types may in this case be written
.... m =
Z Z p~ ’(~ yi;j j mH; ~ ￿2
i;G)’(yi j IH;￿)
p~ ’(~ yi;j j mH; ~ ￿
2
i;G)’(yi j IH;￿)
+(1 ￿ p)~ ’(~ yi;j j mL; ~ ￿
2
i;G)’(yi j IL;￿)
’(yij IH;￿)~ ’(~ yi;jj mH; ~ ￿)dyid~ yi;j:
This approach seems theoretically preferable, but is hard to handle in practice.
This Bayesian approach, however, motivates for an interesting class of distribution
functions ’(:) and ~ ’(:) the use of linear pooling formulas 12 and 13. Winkler (1981)
and Bordley (1982) show that this Bayesian formulation reduces to the linear opinion
pooling formula with minimum variance weights for normally distributed errors as far
as the mean is concerned, which is the relevant statistic in this paper. This result was
extended further by Lindley (1983) and Genest and Schervisch (1985) to a broader
















It may easily be veri￿ed that the normalized expected composed





Keeping the variance of gossip information ￿xed at ~ ￿2
i;G; the problem
of the high and low income consumers in game ￿G may respectively be
put as
MaxIH V (mH ￿ IH) + ￿[mL + (mH ￿ mL)
.... m(￿)] (14)
MaxIL V (mL ￿ IL) + ￿
￿







with IH;IL ￿ 0
The ￿rst order conditions to the consumer problems in equations 14
and 15 can (restricting attention to interior solutions only) respectively
be written as:



















and equivalently for the low types:





















The right hand side of the ￿rst order conditions now contains two
marginal bene￿t e⁄ects of increased status investments: the ￿rst term
between square brackets represents as before an increase in expected im-
pression. The second term represents a new e⁄ect: the change in the
relative importance of costly signaling. When ￿ increases, this gener-
ates more separation in noisy signaling. And this not only raises the
expected impression of the high types, but also the reliability of conspic-
uous consumption as a signal, and hence its importance to spectators as
a source of information. The left hand side still represents the marginal
opportunity costs of status investments.
21How should one understand this impact of changes in ￿ on the
minimal variance weight ￿
￿ =
V ar( ~ P(H;~ yi;j)
V ar(P(H;yi)+V ar( ~ P(H;~ yi;j)? The variance of
the posterior distribution P(H;yi) (the computation for ~ P(H; ~ yi;j) is of
course completely similar) at some point yi may be written:
V ar(P(H;yi);yi)=(1 ￿ P(H;yi))
2 P(H;yi) + (1 ￿ P(H;yi))(P(H;yi))
2
=(1 ￿ P(H;yi))P(H;yi);

























@V ar( ~ P(H;~ yi;j)
@￿m(~ ￿2
i;G) < 0 if one assumes that ’(:) and ~ ’(:) satis-
￿es condition 1. When the normalized di⁄erence in status investments
gets larger, the assessment of one￿ s income through status investments
becomes more distinguishable, and hence the variance of the status in-
vestments posterior decreases. As such, more weight is shifted to the
more precise estimator of quality, or
@￿￿
@￿ > 0:
The double e⁄ect of increased status investments in equations 16 and
17 is somewhat more complicated. The requirement of strict concavity
now becomes for high and low income consumers respectively:
Condition 9 (Second order conditions) Let V (:);￿; ￿2; ~ ￿2
i;G;(mH ￿ mL);
p;’(:) and ~ ’(:) be such that is holds for 8I 2 I that














































22Condition 9 requires that the parameters ￿; ￿2; ~ ￿2
i;G;(mH ￿ mL); p
and the functional forms of V (:); ’(:) and ~ ’(:) are such that the con-
sumer problem is strictly concave, which is satis￿ed if the indi⁄erence
curve in the It-
.... m-plane of both consumer types is more strongly curved
than the
.... m(￿) function over the whole strategy space I. In the term
between square brackets, the second term is always negative. But in




@2￿ can in general
not be determined without further specifying ’(:) and ~ ’(:). One pos-
sible interpretation of condition 9 is again that of a restriction on the
marginal utility of ^ m; ￿; which should not be too great relative to the
marginal utility from rest consumption. When condition 9 applies and
condition 1 holds for density functions ’(:) and ~ ’(:); then the existence
of a unique T-PBNE of game ￿G may easily be shown along the same
lines as proposition 7.
Proposition 10 If condition 9 is satis￿ed and condition 1 holds for ’(:)
and ~ ’(:), then:
1. Game ￿G has a unique and globally asymptotically stable T-PBNE,
denoted by
n

























Part 2 of proposition 10 says that equilibrium status investments of
both types of consumers are monotonically increasing in ~ ￿2
i;G, and hence
monotonically decreasing in the quality of gossip information. The ￿nal
step in this paper is to endogenize ~ ￿2
i;G in function of the structure of
the social network G:
3.2 Optimal signaling and social networks
Consumers obtain information about other consumers by observing their
status investments I and by hearing gossip through their social network.
Such a network may be understood as a collection of bilateral relation-
ships or ￿ links￿ . Two consumers having a link may be friends, neigh-
bors, colleagues or be acquainted in some other way: anything goes, as
long as they share information about others. A social network G 2 G
(with G ￿ N ￿ N2 the set of all possible graphs) is de￿ned by a set of
vertices N = fi = 0;:::; N g, representing consumers, and a set of un-
ordered pairs E = f(i;j) : i;j 2 Ng; which represent relations (￿ edges￿
23or ￿ links￿ ) between the N consumers. For convenience, where it is ob-
vious G denotes the network G(N;E), (i;j) 2 G means (i;j) 2 E,
and i 2 G means similarly i 2 N: A social network G may also be
represented as either a graph, with N nodes or ￿ vertices￿representing
the consumers and a set of lines between these nodes representing the
links. A ￿ path￿between two di⁄erent nodes i and j is a series of consecu-
tive links (ik)(ks)(sv):::(tj) 2 E; with i;k;s;v;t;j 2 N; which connects
node i to node j, and which passes no vertex twice. If such a path
exists, then the two nodes are called ￿ connected￿ . The number of links
in a path is called the ￿ length￿of the path. The number of links of the
shortest path or ￿ geodesic￿between node i and some node j is called the
￿ geodesic distance￿or simply ￿ distance￿of i to j in network G, denoted
d(i;j;G). If no path connects two nodes i and j, then they are called
disconnected, and their geodesic distance is set to +1. If all i;j 2 N are
connected, then we call the network G(N;E) ￿ connected￿ . A network is
disconnected if and only if it consists of more than one ￿ component￿ . A
component of a network G is a maximal connected subgraph, i.e. C is a
component of the network G if (i;j) 2 C ) (i;j) 2 G, if (i;j);(kl) 2 C
implies that there is a path from i to k in C and if (i;j) 2 C and
(j;k) 2 G ) (j;k) 2 C. Hence, a component C of a network G is a
subset of vertices and links, which is such that all the nodes in C are
connected to each other, but not connected to any node outside the sub-
graph C. The component to which node i belongs is simply denoted
by C(i): The diameter of a network or a component G is the maximum
geodesic distance between two nodes that are addressed by links of the
component, and is denoted ￿ d(G) = maxi;j d(i;j;G). Finally, the ￿ degree￿
of a node is the number of links that connect a node to direct neigh-
bors. The degree of a node i, is hence the number edges adjacent to
vertex i, or the number of direct neighbors that are connected to i by
a single link, and it is denoted deg(i;G). If all vertices have the same
degree k, then the graph is called k￿regular. The set of all nodes that
are directly connected to some node i, is called the neighborhood of i,
and denoted ~ N(i;G) = fk;(ik) 2 Eg; such that deg(i;G) =
￿
￿ ￿ ~ N(i;G)
￿
￿ ￿.9
One may also de￿ne a neighborhood setwise, for some subgraph S ￿
G, letting ~ N(S;G) = fk;(ik) 2 G;i 2 G;k 2 GnSg, hence the neigh-
borhood of some subgraph S consists of the vertices which have a link
to a vertex within S, and are not an element of S themselves. The
second neighborhood of some vertex i in a graph G is the neighborhood
of the neighborhood of i, denoted by ~ N2(i;G) = ~ N( ~ N(i;G);G); and
9jSj of a set S denotes the number of elements in that set, as is common notation
in network theory.
24equivalently the j￿th neighborhood of the vertex i, denoted ~ Nj(i;G)
consists of all vertices which are at geodesic distance j of vertex i. Us-
ing the j￿th neighborhood concept, one may then de￿ne the geodesic
(distance) distribution in G from a vertex i as ￿j(i;G) =
￿ ￿ ￿ ~ Nl(i;G)
￿ ￿ ￿:
This geodesic distribution characterizes the distribution of geodesic dis-
tances from some initial vertex i, and hence also the dissemination of
information from some vertex i throughout the social network. Finally,
the most crucial characteristic for the development of noisy status sig-




N￿1 : De￿ne the class of distance-homogeneous networks, GH =
n
G(N;E); ~ d(i;G) = ~ d(j;G); 8i;j 2 N
o
; as the set of all networks in
which the average geodesic is equal for all players.
As information travels along this social network, its quality declines
with the number of links it passes. The longer gossip information takes
to reach someone, the more unreliable it becomes. This decay of in-
formation quality is modelled in a most simple fashion: every time in-
formation passes from one consumer i to another j, it is distorted by
some random error term "i;j; drawn from an independent and identical
distribution with E("i;j) = 0 and V ar("i;j) = ~ ￿2. An important simpli-
￿cation is also that consumers only use one single source of information,
and that they prefer information which has come to them through a
minimal number of nodes, and hence with a minimal burden of error.
In this way, the information about the quality of consumer j, which
reached consumer i through a path (j;k)(k;l)(l;m)(m;i) is character-
ized as ~ yi(j) = m(i)+"j;k+"k;l+"l;m+"m;i = mi+~ "i;j (with i;j;k;l;m 2
N). The variance of this unbiased estimator can now be written as
V ar(~ yi(j)) = V ar(m(i)+"j;k +"k;l +"l;m +"m;i) = 4~ ￿2. More generally,
the variance of any estimation of quality obtained from gossip may then
be written as a function of the geodesic distance between the receiver
j and the subject i of the information, or V ar(~ yi(j)) = d(i;j;G)~ ￿2: An-
other heroic simpli￿cation made in this paper is that every consumer i
cares just as much about the impression she makes on all others: This
now implies for the consumer problem in the case of a connected network
G that the optimal weights using the two sources of information are a
function of average geodesic distance
~ ￿
2
i;G = ~ d(i;G)~ ￿
2: (18)
such that (￿nally!) the consumer problem of the high and low con-
sumer types as a function of social structure becomes:
25Figure 4: Simple and extended cyclical network for N = 8:
MaxIHU = V (mH￿IH)+￿
￿
mL + (mH ￿ mL)
￿
￿




~ d(i j G)~ ￿2
￿￿￿

















One may now inspect the incentives for costly signaling in some
highly stylized and simple social networks, given the assumptions of
signaling and gossip being information substitutes and of information
decay along path length.
3.2.1 Veblen￿ s town and villages: Cyclical networks
Consider ￿rst a cyclical network CN 2 GH; which is such that all of
the N ￿ 3 consumers have exactly two links and hence two ￿ neighbors￿ ,
such that each cyclic network is isomorphic to a network with as a set
of edges Ec = f(1;2);(2;3);:::;(N ￿ 1;N);(N;1)g. This network may
be represented by a simple circle, as illustrated by the black network in
￿gure 4 for N = 8. Each node of a cyclical network is hence necessarily
of degree 2. If game ￿CN is the noisy signaling game ￿G played on a
cyclical social network CN; then corollary 11 shows that ~ ￿2
i;CN = ~ d(i j
G)~ ￿2 is increasing in N for all i 2 N: Therefore, in game ￿CN it holds
by proposition 10 that
@I￿
CN
@N > 0, and that utilitarian welfare is higher
in a network with smaller N:
Corollary 11 If game ￿CN is the noisy signaling game ￿G played on
a cyclical social network CN and I￿
CN represents equilibrium status in-
vestments in the unique T-PBNE of ￿G; then
@I￿
CN












i;CN)) is decreasing in N:
Proof. In appendix.
Instead of varying the number of consumers, one might also vary
the number of social relations which consumers maintain directly in the
network, i.e. one may change the degree of the vertices in the networks.
To explore this idea further, one can assume that consumers now also
can establish links to the direct neighbors of their direct neighbors. This
network is now no longer a cyclical network strictu sensu, but a uni-
dimensional lattice of degree k. I abuse the notation CNjk 2 GH to
denote an average geodesic homogeneous ￿ k-degree cyclical network￿of
N nodes, such that the degree of each node is increased to k in the fash-
ion described above. Clearly, this generalization of the cyclical network
requires that k is even and also that N ￿ k + 1: In ￿gure 4, C8j4 is
illustrated by both black and grey lines. In general, it is shown that av-
erage geodesic distance decreases as may be expected in the degree of all
nodes, such that the incentives to engage in costly signaling investments
are decreasing in the number of social relations consumers maintain in
social network CNjk: When the social network is denser and consumers
maintain more social relations with their peers, information obtained
through the social network will be more reliable, such that equilibrium
investments in status signaling are lower. With respect to the informa-
tion substitutes e⁄ect of social information networks, social welfare is
increasing with the number of relations consumers maintain.
Corollary 12 Let game ￿CNjk be the noisy signaling game ￿G played
on a k￿degree cyclical social network, CNjk 2 GH and let I￿
CNjk be
equilibrium status investments in the unique T-PBNE of ￿CNjk; then
I￿
CNjk ￿ I￿
CNjk0 for k < k0 (with I￿
CNjk > I￿
CNjk0 for k < k0 for I￿
t;CNjk0 in







CNjk)) is increasing in k:
Proof. In appendix.
Both the networks CN and CNjk are in fact unidimensional exam-
ples of a more general class of d-lattices in GH; with d the number of
dimensions. For two dimensions, such a network may be represented as
a grid on the surface of a torus. For three dimensions, it becomes a cubic
lattice. This sort of networks is shortly developed in the appendix.
273.3 Segregation: Social status in disconnected net-
works
A very limited way of loosening the stringent assumption of homogeneity
in average geodesic distance may be found by giving up the connected-
ness of G. If a network consists of more than one component, consumers
have no gossip information about the N ￿jC(i)j consumers outside their
own component, and can only rely on costly signaling to judge these ￿ out-
group￿consumers. The composed estimator of the impression one may

































Let ￿DC be the noisy signaling game ￿G played on a disconnected net-
work DC; consisting of n components Cn (n = 1;:::;n) and with each
component Cn 2 GH and ~ d(i;C(i)) constant. In a sense, the game ￿DC
can be considered a convex combination of games ￿ and ￿G: It is assumed
that consumers are randomly spread over the di⁄erent components, such
that the priors p and (1 ￿ p) are homogeneous over the whole network,
and that all consumers care exactly as much about the impression they
make on all i 2 N. Hence, one cares just as much about the judgement
of close neighbors and unconnected strangers, although this assumption
could easily be relaxed by adding some extra weights to the opinions of
di⁄erent consumers. Finally, it is also necessary that all consumers know
the network G next to the fundamentals of the game (distributions, util-
ity functions...) to deal with the extra dimension of heterogeneity. Given
this knowledge, all consumers have all the information needed to predict
the equilibrium and interpret each observed signaling level yi accordingly,
and the game can be played as before, with the T-PBNE consisting of
a tuple of equilibrium status investments and signal interpretations for
each component separately. Under assumptions of strict concavity sim-
ilar to those above, and stated in condition 17 in the appendix, one may
show the results summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 13 Let game ￿DC be the noisy signaling game ￿G played on a
disconnected network DC; consisting of n0 components Cn (n = 1;:::;n0)
and with each component Cn 2 GH: If consumers are randomly spread
over the di⁄erent components, and all care about the impression they
make on all i 2 N; then (if the conditions 17 and 1 for ’(:) and ~ ’(:)
28hold) one may ￿nd for each Cn a tupple I￿
Cn characterizing equilibrium
status investments in the unique T-PBNE of ￿DC for the consumers in
component Cn: For this I￿
Cn it is true that, keeping ~ d(i;C(i)) constant,
the equilibrium status investments levels are decreasing in the relative












< 0 for I￿
i;Cn in the









Cn)) is on average higher in larger components of a discon-
nected social network.:
Proof. In appendix
This result may be interpreted as members of small, socially isolated
groups, who care about the impression they make on the broad public,
having ceteris paribus a higher incentive to engage in wasteful conspicu-
ous consumption than identical consumers in the majority group. One
example of such a small network components may be socially isolated
ethnic minorities, with no close social connections to the majority but
caring about making a good impression nevertheless. More generally,
any newly arrived migrants, and likewise Veblen￿ s travelling salesmen,
face ceteris paribus higher incentives to spend money wastefully but os-
tentatiously then locals, with ￿rm social roots in the community.
The possibility of disconnected networks also suggests upper and
lower bounds to equilibria of the game ￿G (as a function of the para-
meters of course). The lower bound for the average distance of any
connected social network is that of the complete network, which may
be denoted by CNjN￿1; and for which ~ d(CNjN￿1) = 1: The complete
network is the most dense network, and implies minimal status invest-
ments with respect to G; as the reliability of information is now fully
determined by the relative sizes of ￿2 and ~ ￿2: At the other extreme lies
the empty network, which may be written as CNj0; in which all geodesic
distances equal in￿nity. This is of course the upper bound for average
geodesic distance and diameter in G, and one may write that ￿CN;0 = ￿:
Therefore equilibrium status investments of game ￿; I￿, is the upper
bound for all I￿
G with respect to G. This is summarized in the following
corollary.
Corollary 14 For all T-PBNE and equilibrium status investments I￿
G









If W(G) represents average utilitarian welfare given a social network






G)); then it is true for all G 2 G
29that
W(C
NjN￿1) ￿ W(G) ￿ W(C
Nj0):
3.4 Hierarchies and Centrality: Nested Star Net-
works
It is also possible to deviate from the average geodesic homogeneity
assumption within a component or connected network. In this section,
I investigate in a highly stylized manner how di⁄erences in centrality in
the network result in di⁄erences in average geodesic among consumers
in the same network (or component) and hence in di⁄erences to engage
in status signaling. A star network is a simple network in which N ￿ 1
nodes all have one single link (￿ arms￿ ) to the same node i, called ￿ the
centre￿ . If consumer 1 is the centre of a star network, then the set of
edges is ES = f(1;2);(1;3);:::;(1;N)g: One may generalize this simple
star network into a nested star network Sk;l of l levels and k downward
arms from each nested centre. A nested star Sk;l has one single centre
(at level 1) from which k arms depart to k vertices at level 2. Each of
these k vertices is in it￿ s turn a centre and has k ￿ downward￿arms to
vertices on level 3, which are k2 in total. All these vertices again have k
downward arms, and so on, until one reaches the kl￿1 vertices at level l.
Alternatively, each branch of the star is a tree, which splits l ￿ 1 times
into k branches. Therefore, the degree of the centre of the star is k,
that of the vertices at intermediate levels 2 until l ￿1 is k +1; and that
of the bottom level l is 1. Observe that for k = 1, the nested star Sk;l is





1￿k : Figure 5 illustrates a simple nested star network
S5;4.
Let ￿Sk;l represent the game ￿G played on a nested star Sk;l: Then
the vector of equilibrium status investments in the T-PBNE of ￿Sk;l;
denoted I￿
Sk;l; consists of l ordered pairs I￿
j;Sk;l representing the T-PBNE
signaling strategies for each type a each level j of the nested star. As be-
fore, all fundamentals of the game are known to all spectators, i.e. utility
functions, prior distributions and network structure, such that specta-
tors may calculate the equilibrium status investment values I￿
j;Sk;l for any
consumer at some level j and correctly interpret any pair of observed sig-
nals yi and ~ yi: Since the average geodesic distance is increasing in the
levels of the nested star, it follows by proposition 10 that equilibrium
status investments are lower for consumers which have a more central
position in the nested star social information network. Therefore, con-
ditional on the type, expected utility is higher for consumers with a more
30Figure 5: A nested star S5;4
central position in the nested star social information network. These
results may be summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 15 Let ￿Sk;l represent the game ￿G played on a nested star
Sk;l: Under the conditions 9 and 1 on ’(:) and ~ ’(:); ￿Sk;l has a unique
T-PBNE, characterized by a 2l￿tuple I￿
Sk;l; which speci￿es the optimal
status investment strategy for all types at all levels of the nested star,
and the according posterior beliefs. By proposition 10, it is true for any
level j 2 f1;:::;l ￿ 1g that I￿
j;Sk;l ￿ I￿
j+1;Sk;l: Therefore, expected utility











This result may be interpreted as a complementary mechanism adding
to the countersignaling principle of Feltovich, Harbaugh and To (2002),
who show that in a three types signaling model with a second noisy
source of information, the highest types may in some cases distinguish
themselves from the middle types by not signaling (pooling with the low
types) if they are con￿dent enough that the second signal will distinguish
them from the low types (which the middle types can insu¢ ciently ex-
pect to happen). Feltovich, Harbaugh and To (2002) state that this
mechanism may explain why the very rich and powerful often abstain
from conspicuous wasteful behavior or pressing their power, and I fully
agree with their view. The mechanism described in present paper may
be considered an an additional explanation to some of their results. The
highest types often also occupy very central positions in the social in-
formation network, e.g. because of media attention or the central role
31they play in their organizations. Therefore most other consumers have
relatively reliable information about their type, and as such, they do
not need to engage in conspicuous consumption behavior. Old aristoc-
racy can a⁄ord to be low pro￿le, because they are well rooted in high
society life, whereas ￿ nouveau riches￿need to show their wealth most
ostentatiously to let the power of their money work in social life. Also,
if one would assume a correlation between income level and centrality,
the income e⁄ect and the ￿ centrality e⁄ect￿work in opposite directions
on the equilibrium level of signaling, but signaling incentives are more
pressing for low income types at low levels of centrality.
3.5 Random Networks and Dominance
Finally, one may also wonder whether one can say anything about less
stylized, more random networks. Can one make any predictions about
signaling levels in a fully arbitrary network, without the strong structure
of the strongly stylized networks above? As shown above, spectators
who are in complete knowledge of the fundamentals of the game ￿G;
may correctly predict equilibrium behavior of consumer i for any type,
conditional on her average geodesic ~ d(i;Sk;l); and will hence correctly
interpret the observed signals yi and ~ yi in equilibrium. Given this equi-
librium interpretation by spectators, the optimal strategy of consumer
i is the (under the conditions in equations 9) unique T-PBNE strategy
I￿
i;G: By proposition 10, we know that this equilibrium status signaling
strategy is increasing in the average geodesic distance of consumer i to
the other N ￿ 1 consumers. This motivates some dominance results.
Let G + (k;l) denote the network G(N;E [ f(k;l)g), where it is as-
sumed that (k;l) = 2 E. Hence, G+(k;l) represents the old network with
the number of vertices kept constant, but with one previously inexistent
link added between vertices k and l. Secondly, let G+k denote the net-
work G(N [f(k)g;E) with k= 2 N, or hence the network G with one un-
connected node added. Firstly, one may obviously state that by adding
one link to the social network, the average geodesic distance of all players
weakly decreases ~ d(i;G + (k;l)) ￿ ~ d(i;G);8i 2 N; and this inequality
is strict for all players for whom the absolute value of the di⁄erence in
geodesic distance to the newly linked vertices is two or more, i.e. for
all vertices i for which jd(i;k;G) ￿ d(i;l;G)j ￿ 2; the above inequalities
will be strict, ~ d(i;G + (k;l)) < ~ d(i;G);8i : jd(i;k;G) ￿ d(i;l;G)j ￿ 2,
such that by proposition 10, the equilibrium investments of all these






i;G is in the interior of Ii. Other-
wise, if jd(i;k;G) ￿ d(i;l;G)j < 2, then I￿
G+(k;l) = I￿
G: This also im-
plies that average utilitarian welfare is higher in the extended network:
32W(G) ￿ W (G + (k;l)): For adding an unconnected extra consumer
to the network, the predictions are even more clear-cut. As shown in
corollary 13, adding one more unconnected consumer to the network
increases the marginal utility of status signaling weakly, and strictly





i;G for i connected and I￿
i;G nonzero.
This implies for average utilitarian welfare that W(G) ￿ W (G + k):
The following corollary summarizes these results.
Corollary 16 Let G + (k;l) denote G(N;E [ f(k;l)g) with (k;l) = 2 E





G for 8i : jd(i;k;G) ￿ d(i;l;G)j ￿ 2
if I￿
i;G+(k;l) > 0; and





i;G for all i connected and I￿
i;G
nonzero and
W(G) ￿ W (G + k):
Hence, an extra friendship weakly increases social welfare in society.
And one marginal stranger in the community, about whose judgement
one cares, chases equilibrium wasteful signaling incentives weakly up-
wards, weakly decreasing social welfare.
4 Conclusion
The noisy status signaling game ￿ shows the constant sum nature of
status signaling in a continuous fashion. High income consumers spend
a part of their means to distinguish themselves in the eyes of Bayesian
spectators from the low income types, but because of imperfect obser-
vation of the status investments (and the noise distribution having the
real line for support), separation can never be perfect. For the same
reason, the low income types always ￿nd marginal bene￿ts in status in-
vestments themselves, thus undoing some of the separation achieved by
high types. Unless the low types￿consumer optimum is a corner solu-
tion, the consumption of the low types will in equilibrium be distorted
as well. From a social (utilitarian) point of view, any amount of status
signaling is wasteful, as the gains from status signaling are constant sum
among all of the consumers.
In the second part of the paper, a social information network is in-
troduced, providing a second source of information about player quality.
33This ￿ gossip information￿functions as an information substitute to sta-
tus investments. Because the reliability of information depends on the
structure of the social network, and spectators make in equilibrium more
use of more reliable information, optimal status signaling investments de-
pend on the structure of the social information network in game ￿G: It
is shown for some simple, highly stylized networks, that the incentives
to engage in costly signaling increase with network size, decrease with
network density and decrease with the centrality of a consumer￿ s posi-
tion in the network. One may also ￿nd some simple dominance results
for networks of an arbitrary form, establishing that equilibrium status
investments weakly decrease by adding one more link to the networks,
and weakly increase by adding one more consumer.
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A Appendix







￿’0 [(1 ￿ p)’0 + p’￿] ￿ p’￿’0p’0
￿










a) The squared term between brackets at the RHS is the posterior probability
of any i being a low type. This probability is strictly decreasing in yi given








: b) By part i) of condition 1,
the mean of ’(:) is the mode. Part iii) of condition 1 implies that ’(:)
increases monotonically on the interval ] ￿ 1;￿[; since if ’(:) would be





@y > 0 for ￿0 < ￿; such that ’(:) violates iii). Therefore ’0
￿ is
35negative for all yi < ￿+d￿
2 ; and positive for yi > ￿+d￿
2 to the same extent,
as ’(:) is symmetric. By a), the negative values outweight the positive values
right of ￿+d￿
2 ; such that the integral is negative, and
@ ￿ m(￿)
@￿ > 0.
A.2 Proof of proposition 7.
Proof. Proof of 1: This is rather standard and straightforward. The strat-
egy space I is a compact, convex and non-empty subspace of the Euclidean
space One may for every tuple I = hIL;IHi de￿ne the best reply function






, which is de￿ned over the whole
space I and continuous by the continuity of it￿ s components. The individual
best reply functions IBR
L (IH) are continuous be the continuity of the utility
function and of it￿ s components, and is globally concave under conditions 1
and 6 over it￿ s whole domain, such that the implicit function theorem guaran-
tees the continuity of the best reply functions. Then, by Brouwer￿ s ￿xed point
theorem, f(I) has at least one ￿xed point I￿ which is such that f(I￿) = I￿;
and hence under this condition a T-PBNE exists for ￿.
Proof of 2: Suppose that I./ ￿ hI./
L ;I./
Hi were part of a T-PBNE
fI./;P(H;I./)g such that I./
L > I./
H. Then spectators, knowing the equi-
librium by assumption, take advantage of the fact that j￿./j > 0 to par-
tially distinguish between the low and high income consumers, such that
￿ mL(I./
L ;I./
H) < ￿ mL(I./
H;I./
H) = p; while V (mL ￿ I./
L ) < V (mL ￿ I./
H):
Therefore I./
L cannot be the low income consumer￿ s best reply to I./
H; and
fI./;P(H;I./)g not a T-PBNE.
The second statement follows from the Kuhn-Tucker ￿rst order condi-
tions to the problems of the low and the high income consumers. When
I￿
H = I￿
L; this is either because the ￿rst derivatives of the utility function
towards own status investments are negative over the whole strategy space,
such that I￿
H = I￿

























> 1 as V 00(:) < 0; from which follows that p < 1=2.
Proof of 3 and 4: Fudenberg and Tirole (1991,p.24) show how a suf-
￿cient condition for asymptotic stability of a ￿xed point (that all eigenval-








@2IL holds in a region G(I￿;") around the equilibrium.


























































36in which the ￿rst term is clearly weakly negative and both factors at
the right hand side are strictly positive under the conditions 1 and 6 , and
hence this equality holds for all I 2 I; or G(I￿;") = I; which proves global
asymptotic stability. Uniqueness follows from global asymptotic stability.
A.3 Proof of proposition 8.
Proof. The applied method is the same for all comparative statics estab-
lished below. The equilibrium signaling investments are determined by the
system of ￿rst order conditions in equations 10 and 11. After taking the
derivative of both ￿rst order conditions towards the exogenous parameter of
interest, one may write the thus obtained equations as a system in matrix









(with x representing the
exogenous parameter of interest). By the implicit function theorem, this
system has a unique solution as long as is holds that the determinant of the
coe¢ cients matrix jAj 6= 0 over I (see e.g. Currier, 2000); which is of course



















































the inequality holds as the two factors in the second term are negative every-


























1. Parameter ￿: The derivative of the ￿rst order conditions towards ￿is
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In the same fashion we may derive
37￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
A1;1 b1
A2;1 b2










































@￿ ￿ 0; where the weak inequalities also deal with the possibility that
the restrictions IL ￿ 0 and IH ￿ 0 are binding, such that I￿




















































































































































































































3. Parameter mH: The ￿rst order derivative towards mH, for the high
types:
￿
































38and for low income consumers:











































￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
A1;1 b1
A2;1 b2















































































































4. Parameter mL:The derivatives of the ￿rst order conditions are for the
high income consumers:




























and for the low income consumers
￿


































































































in which the ￿rst term is negative and the second term is positive, such





















































































A.4 Proof of proposition 10.
Proof. Part 1: For existence, uniqueness and global asymptotic stability:
these proofs are essentially the same as for game ￿: If condition 9 applies,
then the implicit function theorem guarantees the existence of continuous best
reply functions IBR
L (IH) and IBR
H (IL). Therefore there exists a continuous






of I onto itself.
And since I is convex, Brouwers￿￿xed point theorem guarantees the existence
of a ￿xed point, I￿
G: This ￿xed point, together with ￿ P(H;yi; ~ yi;j) with I￿
G
in ￿;de￿nes the T-PBNE of game ￿G: Uniqueness and global asymptotic








@2IL ; of which






























for all hIH;ILi 2 I: Hence, global asymptotic stability holds and unique-
ness follows
Part 2: As before, start from the ￿rst order conditions in equations 16
and 17, and take their derivative towards ~ ￿2
i;G:
The derivatives to ~ ￿2




























































































































These derivatives may again be written as a system in matrix form A ￿








































































































































As before, this system has a unique solution, as it holds everywhere that
jAj 6= 0 by condition 9.








































￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
b1 A1;2
b2 A2;2



































has the same sign as the factor between square brackets.
Similarly,
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
A1;1 b1
A2;1 b2


























































In the ￿rst term,
@ ￿ m(￿)
@￿ is positive, and for the factor
@￿￿
@~ ￿2
i;G; one ￿rst needs
to establish the e⁄ect of a marginal increase of ￿ or ~ ￿2
i;G on the posterior
variances. For the case of the status investments posterior (the case for ~ ￿2
i;G










@￿ dyi = ￿
@ ￿ m(￿)
@￿ >
0 (for ￿ > 0): Similarly, one ￿nds that





V ar( ~ P(H;~ yi;j)














i;G; we know that
@￿￿
@￿ =
￿V ar( ~ P(H;~ yi;j)
@V ar(P(H;yi)
@￿






















@￿ > 0. Finally, the sign of































two terms are positive and the third takes the sign of
￿





















































@ ~ m(￿m(~ ￿2
i;G)
@~ ￿2
i;G > 0 (as
~ m(￿m(~ ￿2








i;G ￿ 0; where the weak
inequality takes the possibility of corner solutions into account.
A.5 Proof corollary 11
Proof. De￿ne ￿ = max
￿
n;n 2 N;n ￿ N￿1
2
￿
and note that for j ￿
￿;￿j(i;G) = 2 8i 2 N: The average geodesic distance in a cyclical network









N￿1 : The e⁄ect of a marginal increase of N (and adapting the links





N￿1 ; with ￿0 = max
￿




For N even, it is true that ￿0 = ￿; such that ￿N ~ d(CN) =
(￿+1)￿
N(N￿1) > 0;






A.6 Proof of corollary 12
Proof. Let ￿ = max
￿
n;n 2 N;n ￿ N￿1
k
￿
such that the diameter ￿ d(CN;k) =
￿+I(N ￿1 > k￿); with I(:) an indicator function. The average distance in









2(N￿1) : When increasing the degree k by two units (to maintain
42homogeneity in average geodesic), one ￿nds that
￿k ~ d(C
N;k)= ~ d(C







2j + (￿k ￿ ￿
0(k + 2))(￿ ￿ ￿
0 ￿ 1) + (N ￿ 1 ￿ ￿k)(￿ ￿ ￿
0)











(￿0 + 1)￿0 + (N ￿ 1 ￿ ￿0(k + 2))(￿ ￿ ￿0)
+Minf0;￿0(k + 2) ￿ ￿kg
￿
< 0;
since if one would order all N ￿ 1 vertices by distance from any randomly
chosen vertex i from low to high, then the distance to i in CN;k is a stepwise
increasing function and the di⁄erence between the stepwise increasing distance
functions, summed and divided by N ￿1, reduces to the function elaborated
above. Hence,
￿k ~ d(CN;k)
￿k=2 < 0, such that ~ ￿i;CN;k = ~ d(i;CN;k)~ ￿2 decreases
in k, and hence I￿
CN;k ￿ I￿
CN;k0 for k < k0 by proposition 10 (with I￿
t;CN;k >
I￿
t;CN;k0 for an interior equilibrium).
A.7 Generalisation to d-lattices
Let L
N;k
d denote a d-dimensional lattice, in which each of the N consumers
is linked to the j = k
2d last and j next neighbors along each dimension d,
and is hence of degree k; with k 2 2d:N to preserve homogeneity in degree:
In order to be homogeneous in average geodesic, we need the lattice to be
cyclical along each dimension. For two dimensions, this implies that L
N;k
2
is in fact a two-dimensional grid on the surface of a torus. For simplicity,
I assume that the N consumers are spread equally over all dimensions, i.e.
that from each node i one may move along each dimension d and pass Nd￿1
nodes before returning to node i. Hence, along a single dimension, L
N;k
d is a
CNd;k network and N =
Q
Nd and Nj = Nl for j;l = 1;::;d: For now, let
us assume that Nd 2 k
dN: For the two-dimensional lattice of degree k, de￿ne
￿ as ￿ = max
n






: One can, imagining a two-















2djd(2￿ ￿ s ￿ 1)
￿
for s = ￿ + 1;:::;2￿ ￿ 1. Therefore, the
average geodesic of L
N;k



























2djd(￿ ￿ s ￿ 1)
￿￿
:
For the three-dimensional lattice (a cubic lattice in which the ￿rst elements










f2djd = k + 2djd (s￿1)s

































One may see that for two- and three-dimensional lattices of degree k, it
holds as well that ~ d(L
N;k





may be expected to increase in N and to decrease in k.
A.8 Proof of corollary 13.
Proof. The problem of a high and low income consumer i in some component
C(i) is respectively:






































The ￿rst order condition for the high and low income type is respectively:
￿



















































This problem needs an adaptation of the second order conditions in con-
dition 9:
Condition 17 Let V (:);￿; ￿2; ~ ￿2
i;G;(mH ￿ mL); p;’(:) and ~ ’(:) be such
that is holds for 8I 2 I that




























































Under condition 17, the proof of existence and uniqueness is completely sim-
ilar to that of proposition 10. For the monotonicity in
jC(i)j
N￿1; ￿rst take again































































￿ m(￿) ￿ ~ m(￿m(~ ￿i;C(i)))
￿
￿
































































￿ m(￿) ￿ ~ m(￿m(~ ￿i;C(i)))
￿
￿
















































































































































as before, jAj < 0 under the second order conditions in condition 17, and ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
b1 A1;2
b2 A2;2


































￿ @ ￿ m(￿)
@￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿ m(￿) + ~ m(￿m(~ ￿i;C(i)))
￿




￿ @ ￿ m(￿)














< 0 if fully equivalent to the one above.
45A.9 Proof corollary 15
Proof. How to compute the average geodesic for a nested star Sk;l: As
before, one proceeds by studying the geodesic distance distribution ￿j(i;Sk;l)
for all consumers i 2 N: Note that all consumers on the same level n = 1;:::;l
are in fact identical with respect to the geodesic distance distribution, such
that it is su¢ cient to characterize this distribution for each level ￿j(n;Sk;l);
n = 1;:::;l: For the centre node, this is easy: the geodesic distribution is





sks: For lower levels, things get a bit more complex. At level 2, the
average geodesic distribution is















in which the ￿rst term represents the downward vertices in the own tree, the
second term is the distance to the centre node, and the third term collects
the geodesic distances to the nodes on the other trees of the star. At level 3,
the geodesic distribution is similar, but with one extra term:

























in which the extra term represents the k ￿ 1 trees originating from the node
at level two which is between the studied node (at level three) and the centre
of the star. Also note that the nodes on the other trees from the centre are
now one unit further away. For level 4, one proceeds equivalently, adding an
extra term for k ￿ 1 more trees more on the path to the centre, resulting in











s + (k ￿ 1)
l￿4 P
s=0












Generalizing this, we ￿nd that the average geodesic distance of a node i at

















(s + 1 + n)k
s
!#
in which the ￿rst term again concerns the downward tree leaving from
i, the second term concerns the nodes on the path to the centre node and
the third term collects all the trees departing from one of the nodes on this
path, the centre node included. It may now easily be seen that the average
geodesic distance increases when one moves away from the centre of the star.
46More speci￿cally, a simple computation shows that
￿j ~ d(j;Sk;l)= ~ d(j + 1;Sk;l) ￿ ~ d(j;Sk;l)
=j + (k ￿ 1)
l￿2￿j X
s=0
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